The perpetrators of such local killing operations were SS-men, members of various police agencies, and non-German collaborators. These men, as well as some women, often gained an intimate knowledge of the communities to which they were posted before annihilating them.
They were far less constrained by a rigid system of supervision and control, and thus had much greater opportunity for personal initiative, than the personnel in the camps. They represented the "human" face of genocide: in these small and rather insulated communities contact with the people whose fate depended on the perpetrators' sympathy, rage, kindness or cruelty was frequent, close, and occasionally ambivalent. The non-Jewish local population was another important factor in these towns: its attitude and conduct -ranging from active collaboration with the Germans to indirect profit-making from the destruction of fellow citizens, from willingness to provide shelter to the persecuted to active resistance -could be as decisive in determining the fate of the victims as was the zeal and efficiency of the Nazis. Up to half the Jewish victims of the Holocaust were murdered under such circumstances either in their own towns or following their subsequent deportation to extermination camps. 2 In prosecuting former Nazis in the 1950s and 1960s, German justice had to contend not only with the industrial killing of human beings in the extermination camps, but also with the very different circumstances of eradicating local communities in German-occupied territories.
For this purpose, German courts had to recreate the historical context in which these crimes were committed, often unknown to the public at the time and in many cases still quite murky today.
They also had to work under the constraints of German postwar law.
Following the establishment of the FRG in 1949, the German judiciary rejected the option of applying the new legal concepts of crimes against humanity and genocide to events that occurred before such terms and laws had existed. Crimes against humanity were first defined in the London Charter and the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal in 1945, and codified by the United Nations in 1946. The United Nations' Genocide Convention was adopted in 1948, and subsequently ratified by most member states. 3 But strong German legal opposition to trials based on ex post facto law, which denied the principle of "nulla poena sine lege" (no punishment without prior law), compelled West German courts to apply only conventional criminal law to those indicted for crimes during the Nazi period. 4 The German criminal code defines a murderer as "anyone who kills a human being: from lust for killing, to satisfy his sexual drives, from covetousness or other base motives, treacherously, cruelly, or by means endangering the community or in order to facilitate or conceal another crime." 5 The focus in this definition is therefore largely on the subjective motives of the defendant. In the case of Nazi crimes, such "base" motives could rarely be attributed to defendants who participated in a genocidal state-directed undertaking and acted within the framework of military, police, or bureaucratic hierarchies apparently sanctioned by law and in accordance with directives emanating from the highest echelons of the state.
Considering the specific circumstances of the Third Reich, the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) determined that "base motives" would include racial hatred and antisemitism. Thus defendants motivated by antisemitism to kill Jews would fall under the definition of murder, whereas those who did so merely under orders would not. This naturally led Nazi defendants to deny any antisemitic motivation. It is therefore not surprising that antisemitism appears to have rarely featured among the reported motives of Nazi perpetrators.
And since it is in any case notoriously difficult to determine such subjective motives if they are not attested to by the defendant, very few murder convictions were ever reached on this basis. 6 German defendants also tried to invoke the argument of superior orders (Befehlsnotstand), which the Nuremberg Tribunal had rejected. This line of defense, however, was deemed inadmissible also by West German courts. 7 Nevertheless, the need to prove subjective "base motives" for a murder conviction meant that most defendants whose cases were not entirely dismissed were eventually convicted of either manslaughter or of aiding and abetting as accomplices to murder. As of 1960 charges of manslaughter fell under the statute of limitations, whereas conviction as accomplice to murder often carried ludicrously light sentences. 8 Moreover, conduct which could be shown to have constituted treachery or cruelty, and might therefore bring a murder conviction, was attributed primarily to those rare, lower-rank sadists who were neither representative of the mass of the perpetrators nor responsible for most of the killings.
The ironic result of this legal logic was that while a few "excess perpetrators"
(Exzeßtäter) of the lower ranks received life sentences, many of the higher ranking organizers of local mass killings were either acquitted or given very short prison terms. 9 This also meant that the courts created an entirely false picture of the nature of genocide, depicting those who carried out genocidal orders as far less guilty than those who manifested sadistic traits. The implication was that the killings were the result of unauthorized actions by a few depraved individualsquite incapable of organizing a continent-wide genocide -rather than the outcome of a well coordinated undertaking conducted by perfectly "normal" officials following the procedures of military, police, and bureaucratic organizations. Yet without these officials' willing, and quite often enthusiastic collaboration, the mass murder of the Jews would never have attained such a devastating magnitude.
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THE SITE
Historians have written a great deal on the decision-making process that led to the Final Solution, 11 as well as on the concentration and extermination camps, 12 the regional implementation of genocide and its links to policies of ethnic cleansing and economic exploitation, 13 and on the motivation of the men who carried out mass murder. 14 Yet we still know very little about what happened in the thousands of communities that came under German occupation, especially in Eastern Europe and the western regions of the Soviet Union. 15 Considering that much of the Holocaust actually occurred in such communities, this gap in our knowledge is quite startling.
But this is not only a matter of expanding our knowledge. For even the little we already know about the manner in which genocide unfolded in the vast array of East European towns and the surrounding villages seems to shed new light on the Holocaust as an historical event. It may also help expose both similarities and differences between the mass murder of the Jews and other genocides. For these towns were in large part made up of several religious and ethnic communities, and the relations between these groups played an important role in the fate of the victims. 16 Such towns also provided the social context for far more intimate and dynamic relations between perpetrators, victims, collaborators, and bystanders, not least because the status of each of these groups was often far from stable. Indeed, focusing on such communities reveals that the category of bystanders had very little meaning, that there was a surprising degree of overlap between rescuers and collaborators, and that even victims and perpetrators might reverse roles, often more than once. Finally, and most relevant to the present discussion, the study of such towns makes it possible to gain a much more intimate knowledge of the perpetrators and their relationship with the communities in which they lived, as well as with the men, women, and children they murdered.
The sources for such reconstructions are numerous and varied. They range from contemporary documents to testimonies, diaries, and interviews. 17 Concerning the perpetrators, the records of their indictments and trials are often the most detailed and revealing. But these records expose more than the facts of the matter. For, just as important, they demonstrate the manner in which German courtrooms constructed a view of the Holocaust that differed from the convention at the time and still remains unfamiliar today: not of detached and impersonal mass extermination in the camps, but of face-to-face relations between Germans and Jews which almost always -but often after relatively lengthy acquaintance -ended up in face-to-face killing.
In undertaking this sociology and psychology of genocide, West German courts strove to locate the perpetrators on the margins of German society and culture and on the extreme end of the scale of baseness. In this manner they hoped to limit the destabilizing effect on postwar Germany that might have resulted from the courts' actual findings about the utter conventionality of many of the defendants.
Location mattered a great deal also in the geographical sense. For the German occupiers and perpetrators, as well as for the German courts, the East European towns in which these massacres occurred meant very little. For the local population they were often sites of long histories and memories, rich culture and deep religious roots. The German occupiers and postwar lawyers, judges, journalists, and the public, were oblivious to all that. For them the question was:
How did civilized Germans behave in such a murderous fashion? And part of the answer was that they had strayed out of a social and cultural context that would have otherwise restrained them and preserved their civility.
This was also the reason that German courts found it easier to accept testimonies from witnesses whose credentials included professional training at German/European institutions of higher learning, even though men with similar training featured prominently among the perpetrators as well. Consequently, the courts strove to create a picture of the defendant that distanced him from the rest of German society, indeed, even from the judges themselves, and postulated that such distance -political, cultural, ethnic, or psychological -was at the root of the crime. Underlying this assumption was also the notion that the site of the crimes was essentially different; though not a camp (which was after all created by the Germans) it was a strange and far-off territory, where certain types of otherwise unacceptable behavior seemed to be legitimate.
In what follows I will discuss two towns and the trials of a few perpetrators who participated in the destruction of their Jewish communities. Buczacz is known to have had a Jewish population since the early sixteenth century.
During the nineteenth century the Jewish community greatly expanded, so that by 1880 it constituted the vast majority of the population, almost 7,000 Jews out of a total of just under 10,000 inhabitants. Despite a relative decline due to emigration in the last decades of the century and the years leading to World War I, in 1914 Buczacz had a population of 3,500 Poles, 2,000
Ukrainians, and 7,500 Jews. The demographics in Czortków were similar, so that in 1910 there were just under 3,000 Jews in a town with a total population of slightly over 5,000 people. Ghetto's Oneg Shabbat archive Emanuel Ringelblum, and the "Nazi hunter" Simon Wiesenthal.
These towns were also sites of increasing nationalist mobilization and intellectual activity by the Ukrainians, who constituted the majority of the population in the rural areas, and by the Poles, who maintained cultural and political dominance despite being a minority in the region.
In September 1939 the entire region came under Soviet rule as Poland was divided between the USSR and Nazi Germany. The Soviets deported large numbers of citizens:
nationalist Poles and Ukrainians as well as bourgeois and Zionist Jews. 19 As war broke out there were an estimated 10,000 Jews, 5,000 Ukrainians, and 2,000 Poles in Buczacz, and about 6,000 Thomanek's first posting in Galicia was to the Jewish forced labor camps established along the planned route of Thoroughfare IV (Durchgangsstrasse IV or DG IV), an important transportation artery that the Germans hoped to build between Lemberg, the capital of Galicia, to
Taganrog on the Ukrainian-Russian border. 25 Construction and repair crews were taken from many towns in the region, including Czortków and Buczacz. The work was physically exhausting, nutrition and hygiene were appalling, and disease was rampant. Peckmann's alibi of having been on leave at the time of the second killing, it also rejected as unreliable the testimonies of the two witnesses of these events. 26 The testimony of the first witness, the 49-year-old dentist H., was dismissed on "objective grounds," namely, that he could have misheard the name of the victim, Seldmann, as that of the indicted, Peckmann, who might not have even been present at the site of the killing.
The court did not question the testimony on "subjective grounds," however, which is to say that it did not assume that the witness was consciously lying.
Conversely, the testimony of the 51-year-old elementary school teacher R. was not only rejected on "objective grounds" but the court also implied that it had some suspicions about the witness's ability to tell the truth. The main, and somewhat extraordinary reason for this doubt, was an earlier testimony about the killing of Auerbach given by the witness to the Jewish Historical Commission shortly after the liberation of Galicia. According to this testimony Peckmann had in fact killed more Jews on the same occasion. The court could not reconcile the earlier version with the witness's later testimony that Peckmann had only shot Auerbach. The implication was that since the witness might have exaggerated in testifying to the Jewish Commission, there was no reason to believe that his second statement to a German court was any more truthful. 27 Peckmann was thus acquitted for lack of evidence for personally committing murder. An attempt to reopen judicial proceedings against him in 1970 also failed. By then Peckmann was 66-years-old, and seemed destined to end his life in the comfort of his own home. 28 The case of Kurt Köllner was far more complex. For here was a man who not only claimed, as we have seen, to have joined the SS merely to protect his socialist father, but also one who consistently asserted his friendly feelings toward Jews. Thus Köllner told the court that throughout the 1930s he had maintained amicable relations with some Jewish families. He even helped one of his Jewish acquaintances to emigrate by buying up his possessions -in all probability for a suitably meager sum considering the galloping "Aryanization" of Jewish property at the time. Köllner also recalled in 1962 that he had openly criticized the Kristallnacht pogrom, and that he saved some other non-Jewish friends who had gotten into trouble with the authorities. Yet his nickname, "Mäuschen" (mousy), suggests another aspect of Köllner's personality. 29 Even while serving in the SS, Köllner supposedly kept intervening on behalf of Jews. As he asserted at his trial, Köllner received special praise from his superior at the Sipo post in Warsaw, Kriminalkommissar (Lieutenant or detective superintendent) Engels, for curbing Polish and Ukrainian extortions from Jews. Indeed, it would seem that in Engels he found yet another friend of the persecuted. Once he arrived in Lemberg and was employed in the construction of the DG IV, Köllner opined to SSPF Katzmann that without sufficient food, accommodation, and clothing, Jewish forced labor would not be productive. He also noted that thanks to their preponderance among Galicia's craftsmen, the Jews were indispensable to the military.
Unfortunately, Katzmann paid no heed to these arguments, since he saw the road-building project as nothing but Vernichtung durch Arbeit -extermination through labor of the local Jewish population.
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According to Köllner, it was because of his "defense" of the Jews that he was transferred Consequently the community was caught unprepared: some 3,000 Jews were deported to Bełżec, and another 300 were shot on the street. Jewish communities in the area. 32 Yet such generalized responsibility for genocide was not sufficient to bring about conviction in German courts. As we have seen, it was necessary to prove that the defendant was directly guilty of specific murders; that he acted with "base motives," such as sexual lust or sadism; and that his actions were on his own initiative or in awareness of being in fulfillment of clearly unlawful orders. Thomanek admitted that he had been present at shootings and mass executions, but denied taking part in them. He also admitted to having been in charge of several camps in the Czortków area and to participating in the liquidation of the Czortków camp, but claimed that he shot Jews only in self-defense, or in compliance with his superiors' orders. Thomanek submitted to the court that, "today he knows that it is a terrible crime to eradicate an entire race. But at the time he could not refuse orders, since it was said, 'Whoever doesn't cooperate with us is against us.'" 35 Thomanek was charged with a long series of crimes. For these and other cases in nearby Tarnopol, the court relied on several witnesses. They included Dr. R., who was working at the time of the trial as head doctor in Israel and had served as a physician in the Kamionki camp. The doctor described Thomanek as the second most powerful man in the camp, noting that the inmates called him "Der Erschiesser" (the shooter).
Born in 1908 in Tarnopol, Dr. R. had studied in his home town as well as in Vienna, Prague and Italy, and was raised speaking German. These credentials convinced the court of the veracity of his testimony.
The court found the testimony of the witness G. reliable for similar reasons. Born near Kamionki in 1913 and a law school graduate in interwar Poland, G. reported that the defendant was known at the time as "the red dog Thomanek" because of his red hair and brutality. The witness O., born in 1891, was the owned of a lumber business and a brick factory in Tarnopol.
He had studied law in Lemberg and Vienna and had served as an officer in the AustrianHungarian army. This witness described the arbitrary shooting by Thomanek of his 21-year-old nephew, Osias Seräth, who was kneeling with a group of other youths in the town square of Tarnopol during a roundup. The court accepted his testimony without reservation. She too was shot on the spot. 39 Thomanek's version that he had tried to save the people he knew by selecting them, but had been compelled to defend himself when a Jew wielding a pipe-wrench attacked him, was rejected by the court. The court also dismissed Thomanek's assertion that he merely collected the victims' valuables at the airfield rather than participating in the shooting. 40 Indeed, as it turned out, Thomanek was involved in killings throughout the region.
In February 1943 Thomanek participated in a mass execution on the Fedor Hill, near
Buczacz, in which some 500 Jews were shot in groups of ten into a pre-dug trench after being forced to undress. In April 1943, during another killing operation in Buczacz, Thomanek was strolling down the main street with the head of the Jewish council, Baruch Kramer (or Kraemer), when they encountered four young Jews who were caught trying to escape. One of them, Akiba
Weissmann, ran up to Kramer and cried: "Baruch, save me, I want to live." Kramer responded:
"I can't help you." But as Weissmann persisted, Thomanek pulled out his pistol and shot him point blank. 41 A few days later Thomanek and another SS-man raided a restaurant near Buczacz on a tip by a Ukrainian waitress. They found ten Jews who were being hidden by the new Ukrainian owner. They included former owner Leonie Folkenfolk, his wife, and their 9-year-old son; Dr.
Fonki Neinan, his wife, their 5-year-old child, his mother-in-law, and his brother-in-law; and a man named Tischler together with his pregnant wife. Thomanek stripped the Jews of their valuables and shot them all with his submachine gun. The last to be shot was the pregnant woman, who threw herself at his feet and begged for her life. The court concluded its review of witness testimony with the following statement:
During the entire proceedings the court paid special attention to all such issues that were of the greatest significance to the credibility of the witnesses and, in view of these special circumstances, the court employed the strictest standards in weighing the credibility of the witnesses. The witness testimonies were therefore carefully scrutinized and assessed. The judgment was based only on witness testimonies in which errors caused by flawed observation or flawed memory as well as untrue statements could be ruled out with certainty. 48 Köllner denied all charges. Not only did he stubbornly maintain that he had always had good relations with the Jews of Czortków, he went so far as to claim that some Jews even willingly Köllner's attempt to plead mistaken identity and to incriminate a fellow SS-man also failed. He then claimed to have been on sick leave when many of the crimes in the indictment were committed. His wife provided an alibi for this assertion, but the veracity of her testimony was completely discredited by her extraordinary assertion that during her lengthy stay in Czortków she never knew about the mass killings of the Jews there. 49 The court found Köllner guilty of most of the crimes as charged. Its findings concerning the Borszczów execution of 28 Jews are especially instructive, considering that in this case Köllner had not personally shot anyone, and that neither Köllner nor Peckmann were charged with the organization and supervision of the mass killing of tens of thousands. According to the court, Köllner had conceded during an earlier interrogation that he had in fact been in charge of the execution squad. Moreover, the court rejected Köllner's assertion of moral qualms. As the closing statement noted, the court does not believe the defendant that he had inner reservations against taking part in the execution action. What contradicts this claim is first, that by that time he had already shot many Jews, even on his own initiative; second, his entire attitude toward the Jews proves that he had no humane considerations in his treatment of the Jews. 50 In explaining Köllner's motivation, the court referred to a comment made by his father after the war, namely, that "now his son must put out of his head his previous attitude and previous apply these values to the new political situation and his willingness to be seduced by the promises and opportunities of Nazism:
[Köllner] received a completely normal education in his parental home and at school and was raised in a democratic state….
[H]e recognized quite early the danger of National Socialism… [and] remained inwardly unmoved by [its] ideas and goals… even after he joined the SS…. All this indicates that the defendant… would have probably continued to lead an ordinary bourgeois existence, had he not increasingly succumbed to the temptations of National Socialist ideology following the transformation of the political conditions. In this sense he becamelike many others -a victim in the wider sense of the circumstances of the time.
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Speaking directly to the vexed issue of personal guilt within what was, after all, a criminal state, the court presented Köllner as a man who knew that he was committing a crime and yet did so for personal gain:
[Köllner's] guilt consists… in the fact that he sacrificed his previous moral and human restraints and that in the effort to promote his own advancement and profit as much as possible, he became a compliant and pliable instrument of the regime of the time, especially in the planned eradication of the Jews, even though, according to his own description, he knew precisely "that this is murder." 53 Moreover, the court argued that Köllner's conduct served the goals of the Nazi regime and implied thereby that it was precisely opportunists of his ilk who were the instruments of Nazi power and genocide. But again a certain degree of ambivalence crept into the judges' attempt to distinguish between opportunism and conviction; for while Köllner was said to have acted "only" for personal gain, the court attributed to him racist and thus potentially ideological sentiments as well:
Through his deeds he consciously sustained and strengthened the National Socialist dictatorship's rule over the Jews. He thereby made himself into the arbitrary master over life and death of his Jewish victims in his capacity as Judensachbearbeiter and by this means disseminated fear and terror. This is not to deny that in individual cases of momentary caprice he showed kindness to his favorites and to such persons from whom he could expect material profit. The court is convinced that this too happened only out of calculation and for his personal profit. The defendant acted out of this general attitude and out of a feeling of supposed racial superiority… 54 Kurt Köllner was consequently found guilty of nine counts of murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In reaching this verdict, the court noted that "these acts were perpetrated in a period in which the actions of the regime of the time extensively effaced the concepts of justice and injustice and in which the respect for human life had largely vanished." Conversely, the court insisted that "the defendant committed offenses against defenseless people and that he pitilessly and without any scruples destroyed or wanted to destroy the lives of elderly and in part ill persons as well as the lives of young people." 55 Thus the ambivalence of punishing a murderer who acted "normally" in abnormal times, or of bringing to justice an otherwise perfectly "normal" person who had been transformed into a murderer by the circumstances of his time, remained at the heart of the judgment. We might say that it is still there, not only regarding the According to the court's logic, Thomanek's guilt therefore had to derive from his ability to distinguish between criminal and lawful orders, or, more generally, between Good and Evil.
As in Köllner's case, the court assumed that this ability was acquired by Thomanek at home and in school:
The defendant was raised in well-ordered family circumstances…. He was educated according to the general moral teachings… [and] he had a confessional commitment…. Through this personal development the inviolability of human life was always presented to him, so that this fundamental concept of morality was drilled into his consciousness. The defendant was also educated in the then democratic Czechoslovakia… in which there was no racial hatred….
[U]ntil he joined the Waffen-SS he had no contact with Jews. The judges had no time for such arguments. As they forcefully put it, "[t]his assertion by the defendant that he initially had doubts, but then became convinced that the order was just, is pure evasion." For the court it seemed crystal clear that "[t]he basic ethical rules, which were taught to the defendant for many years, could not and were not undermined and extinguished by the brief statement of an SS general." What, then, was the true reason for Thomanek's compliance?
According to the court, "the conviction that the actions of the SS against the Jews were just could only exist -if at all -in people into whom National Socialist ideology had been drilled for many years." And yet, as the court noted, "[t]his was not the case of the defendant. He was a grown, mature man… who… had been educated in a Christian and democratic spirit." There are no simple answers to these questions, and the court was certainly not called upon to address them. Nevertheless, the judges' assumption that over-consumption of alcohol indicated moral revulsion and served to either blunt one's moral sensibilities or evade massacre altogether is quite revealing. In making the dissolute into people of conscience and absolving the ideologues by denying their moral choice, the court's argumentation sheds light on the much wider issue of German confrontations with complicity in genocide and the uncomfortable role of conviction in "coming to terms" with the national and personal Nazi past.
Less problematically from a moral point of view but of major legal significance, the court also rejected Thomanek's assertion of superior orders. This was the most common argument raised by former Nazi perpetrators after the war, even though the Nuremberg Tribunal had already dismissed it in 1945. In Thomanek's case, the judges noted that "the situation of the defendant at the time was not such, that he could only save himself from a threat to his own life and body by acting as he did."
In fact, the court argued, it had not been shown that all SS men followed Katzmann's order to the letter, or that in the Kamionki camp "an SS man who did not take part in executions of Jews faced danger to his own life and limb." The court conceded that had Thomanek refused to shoot Jews, "he would have had to reckon with being dismissed from his post and possibly being sent to the front." Obviously Thomanek did not cherish this prospect. But the threat of being forced to do what millions of other Germans were already doing certainly did not justify compliance with criminal orders. 63 The Hagen court found Thomanek guilty of 26 counts of murders and sentenced him to life imprisonment. But in explaining its reasoning for this decision, the court described Thomanek's guilt using precisely the same logic that the Saarbrücken court had employed in the case of Köllner. For here too, Thomanek was said to have been a victim of his time and circumstances. This argument referred not only to Thomanek but, by extension, to an entire generation of German men, including the court itself. "The question of the defendant's motivation for his deeds," wrote the judges, can only be answered by reference to his career, his personality, and his attitude to National Socialism. The defendant was… raised in a Christian spirit and grew up in a democratic state. The fundaments of a general ethical teaching were planted in him…. The court is… convinced that in all likelihood the defendant would have continued to lead a decent life, had he not come into contact with the horrible ideas and plans of the SS leadership through the transformation of the political circumstances and especially through the war. Clearly he does not carry any responsibility for these ideas and plans as well as for the transformation of the political circumstances and the war. To this extent he became -like many others with him -in a wider sense also a victim of that time. 64 Following this general justification of complicity in Nazi crimes, the court elaborated Thomanek's particular circumstances. And whereas in Köllner's case it was his socialist home that provided the foil against which his actions were measured, for Thomanek it was his ambiguous ethnic identity that featured most prominently. Indeed, this mixed identity helped distinguish between Thomanek and most "ordinary" Germans, even as these "ordinary"
Germans' complicity had already been explained away by the court's interpretation of circumstantial victimhood. Thomanek, argued the judges, was primarily motivated by an urge to become an even better German than his purely "Aryan," true Reich-German comrades. Not merely a victim of the political circumstance of Nazi rule, his fate was formed also by the circumstance of being a resident of the borderlands [dass er ein Grenzbewohner war], a man whose national identity [Volkstumszugehörigkeit] could have been seen as somewhat questionable. The defendant declared… that the Czechs did not see him as a fully rightful citizen, because he was German, and that the Germans had also initially not seen him as a fully rightful German, because he had previously lived in Czechoslovakia. These circumstances stimulated many of these border-or ethnic-Germans, once they were back under German rule, to endeavor to demonstrate and prove from that point on that they were especially reliable and especially "good Germans." The defendant also made such an endeavor. 65 Yet if Thomanek's circumstances explained his motivation so well, where, after all, lay his guilt? Here too the court employed a remarkably similar rhetoric to that which had been used to condemn Köllner. But while Köllner's opportunism was one of power and material enrichment, Thomanek's was focused on establishing his identity, which would then also ensure him of a more secure status and greater material comfort. "The guilt of the defendant consists,"
argued the judges, in that as a result of his weakness of character he subordinated all the basic teachings he had earlier acquired to the effort to prove himself to be a "reliable" German, and that he went so far in this effort… as to offer himself ruthlessly and unconditionally to his contemporary superiors… not because he was convinced of the moral justification of this conduct, but because he saw it as serving his own personal interest. He clearly understood the dreadful injustice that would be carried out against the Jews…. But he also saw that the National Socialists, especially the SS with their program and their actions, were in power and in a certain sense were "masters of the world." He saw… that he could share that power and that when he behaved in the manner required and expected of him by his superiors, things went well for him personally…. He led a good life both in Kamionki and later in Czortków. He had his own house in both places and even had his own room in Buczacz. In Czortków he owned a car and had a batman, who for his part also had an assistant [one of the Jewish witnesses]. For a certain time he was in a position to accommodate his wife and child and even his father. These are privileges that would have normally not been reserved for a simple SS man…. The defendant was offered them because he excelled in the "treatment" of the Jews… For this reason he was also then given command of the camp in Czortków and… [of] other camps in the area… all while still a mere private. This gave him a position of enormous power beyond any proportion to his rank… .
[He] did not want to be called up by the Wehrmacht and be sent to a frontline unit. Motivated by these selfish reasons the defendant thus became a compliant accessory of the National Socialist dictatorship. 66 Thomanek was therefore guilty precisely because he could tell Good from Evil and chose to serve the latter in order to further his own selfish interests. In this Faustian bargain, he acted neither under compulsion nor was he incapable of evading the circumstances in which he found himself. He joined the police in order to avoid the front; he brutalized others in order to gain his superiors' favor; he killed on his own initiative in order to enhance and maintain his power. He also formed his own understanding of what becoming a "good German" meant: he believed that his German identity could only be ensured by carrying out the genocidal plans of the regime.
And yet, in the eyes of the court, he also remained a victim of his circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The court's characterization of this SS perpetrator contained other contradictions. The court condemned Thomanek for having chosen to kill Jews rather than risking his life at the front. This would imply that had he gained a better understanding of what it meant to be a "good German," he would have refused the orders of the SS and participated instead in the Wehrmacht's attempt to subjugate Europe and Russia to German rule. Thus the court posited that compared to Himmler's troops, Hitler's soldiers were decent and upright patriots.
Furthermore, if Thomanek was motivated by his ambivalent status as an ethnic German, could one extrapolate from his case and say that ambiguous Germans were more likely to be
Himmler's willing executioners than "real" Germans? Or that Nazi indoctrination did not matter, since those who had not been subjected to it were just as bad, or even worse? And consequently, was one to conclude that such decent men as perhaps the judges themselves, who had presumably lived under Hitler's rule during the war, either practicing the law or serving in the Wehrmacht, were not as likely to act like Thomanek, the mischling Czech-Moravian-German who evaded service at the front and had to prove his Germanness by killing Jews?
We have examined three men who were at the sharp end of the Holocaust. Peckmann was a professional policeman; Köllner came from a socialist family; Thomanek was raised in Czechoslovakia. The professional policeman Peckmann, who in another historical context would have been the most representative of "ordinary Germans," but during the war was one of the commanders of the Sipo outpost in Czortków and thus the man responsible for the murder of many of the region's 60,000 Jewish victims, was acquitted. Köllner and Thomanek, one representing the compromised left-wing milieu, the other a son of Germany's ambivalent borderlands, could hardly be seen as the embodiment of the German "heartland" that was still perceived as the source of authority and morality in the Federal Republic of the early 1960s.
These two convicted perpetrators do not easily fit the stereotype. Thomanek appears at first sight as the typical low-ranking Nazi perpetrator, crass, brutal, and sadistic. But as the Hagen court discovers, he was only partly German, was raised as a good Christian in a decent family, and acted out of overzealousness to be accepted into the fold of the German nation.
Köllner too seems initially like a typical Nazi; less brutal and more slick, but otherwise quite true to type. But as the Saarbrücken court reveals, he comes from a family with deep socialist roots.
Neither of these men would have become a mass murderer had the Nazis not come to power. But then of course the Nazis came to power, maintained it, and used it to perpetrate genocide, precisely because such men as Köllner, Thomanek, and, of course, Peckmann, were so willing to help them. Or rather, "the Nazis" were such men as Köllner, Thomanek, and Peckmann.
The judges struggled with this conclusion, because ultimately it implicated large numbers of Germans, including, possibly, themselves. They had to show that decent men could become killers if in evil times they abandoned their humanity for opportunistic reasons. But of course very few people in Nazi Germany did not exercise a measure of opportunism and the vast majority sacrificed a greater or lesser portion of their humanity. This was a question of degree, and circumstances. And even after the fact, most men walked free, men like Peckmann, who continued to enforce law and order in the Federal Republic, and innumerable other lawyers, judges, physicians, professors, biologists, anthropologists…. They became the mainstay of postwar society for another generation, and were treated with the same respect accorded to those
Jewish witnesses who had earned medical and law degrees at prewar European institutions
On the one hand, the perpetrators remain elusive figures: the convicted were not typical, and the typical were not convicted. On the other hand, when we observe such an unfathomable event as the Holocaust at the local level, we realize its human dimensions, even at their most inhuman. Ultimately, much of what we would like to think about the Holocaust turns out to be different when observed from close by: the perpetrators often knew the victims; they were motivated by the most conventional urges and desires even if they committed the most abominable crimes; the killing was both systematic and gratuitous, often without any specific motive apart from a sense of power and impunity; the killers knew that they were committing murder even as they were killing, and chose to act as they did because they hoped to gain from their actions, as indeed they often did, just as they hoped never to pay a price for their crimes, which indeed rarely happened. Even when the reckoning finally came, it arrived belatedly, often in much diluted form, and invariably carefully wrapped in layers of rationalizations that protected society from being drawn into the scene of the crime.
